Hanoi’s latent hostility to its then ally was brought home to me on a visit to Hanoi in February 1973 designed to work out the implementation of the Paris Agreement, which had been initialed two weeks earlier. S? thù ngh?ch ng?m ng?m c?a Hà N?i ??i v?i ??ng minh c?a nó khi ?ó ???c t? rõ v?i tôi trong m?t cu?c th?m vi?ng Hà N?i h?i Tháng Hai 1973, ???c trù li?u ?? gi?i quy?t s? thi hành Hi?p ??nh Paris, v?n ???c ký k?t hai tu?n tr??c. Le Duc Tho took me on a visit to Hanoi’s national museum primarily to show me the sections devoted to Vietnam’s historic struggles against China—still formally an ally of Vietnam. Lê ??c Th? ?ã ??a tôi ?i th?m b?o tàng vi?n qu?c gia c?a Hà N?i, ch? y?u ?? ch? cho tôi th?y các ph?n dành cho các cu?c ??u tranh l?ch s? c?a Vi?t Nam ch?ng l?i Trung Qu?c – v?n chính th?c là m?t ??ng minh c?a Vi?t Nam. With the fall of Saigon in 1975, the inherent and historic rivalries burst into the open, leading to a victory of geopolitics over ideology. V?i s? s?p ?? c?a Sàigòn trong n?m 1975, các s? tranh giành l?ch s? và c? h?u bùng n? thành công khai, d?n ??n m?t s? chi?n th?ng c?a ??a chính tr? trên ý th?c h?. It proved that the United States was not alone in wrongly assessing the significance of the Vietnam War. Nó ?ã ch?ng t? r?ng Hoa K? không ??n ??c trong vi?c l??ng ??nh m?t cách sai l?m ý ngh?a c?a Chi?n Tranh Vi?t Nam. When the United States had first intervened, China viewed it as a kind of last gasp of imperialism. Khi Hoa K? v?a m?i can thi?p l?n ??u, Trung Qu?c ?ã nhìn nó nh? m?t ki?u h?t h?i sau cùng c?a ch? ngh?a ?? qu?c. It had—almost routinely—cast its lot with Hanoi. Nó ?ã – g?n nh? th??ng l? -- bu?c s? ph?n c?a nó v?i Hà N?i. It interpreted the American intervention as another step toward the encirclement of China—much as it had viewed the U.S. intervention in Korea a decade earlier. Nó ?ã gi?i thích s? can thi?p c?a Hoa K? nh? m?t b??c ti?n n?a ??n s? bao vây Trung Qu?c – gi?ng nh? nó ?ã nhìn s? can thi?p c?a Hoa K? t?i Tri?u Tiên m?t th?p niên tr??c ?ó. Ironically, from a geopolitical point of view, Beijing’s and Washington’s long-term interests should have been parallel. M?t cách m?a mai, t? m?t quan ?i?m ??a chính tr?, các quy?n l?i tr??ng k? c?a B?c Kinh và Hoa Th?nh ??n ph?i song hành v?i nhau. Both should have preferred the status quo, which was an Indochina divided among four states. C? hai ??u ?a thích s? duy trì nguyên tr?ng (status quo), t?c m?t ?ông D??ng ???c phân chia gi?a b?n qu?c gia. Washington resisted Hanoi’s domination of Indochina because of the Wilsonian idea of global order—the right of self-determination of existing states—and the notion of a global Communist conspiracy. Hoa Th?nh ??n ?ã kháng c? s? th?ng tr? c?a Hà N?i t?i ?ông D??ng b?i ý t??ng t? th?i [T?ng Th?ng] Wilson v? tr?t t? toàn c?u – quy?n t? quy?t c?a các qu?c gia hi?n h?u – và khái ni?m v? m?t âm m?u C?ng S?n toàn c?u. Beijing had the same general objective, but from the geopolitical point of view, because it wanted to avoid the emergence of a Southeast Asia bloc on its southern border. B?c Kinh ?ã có cùng m?c tiêu t?ng quát, nh?ng t? quan ?i?m ??a chính tr?, b?i vì nó ?ã mu?n né tránh s? xu?t hi?n c?a m?t kh?i ?ông Nam Á ? biên gi?i phía nam c?a nó. For a while, Beijing seemed to believe that Communist ideology would trump a thousand-year history of Vietnamese opposition to Chinese predominance. Trong m?t lúc, B?c Kinh d??ng nh? tin t??ng r?ng ý th?c h? C?ng S?n s? ?ánh th?ng m?t l?ch s? nghìn n?m ch?ng ??i c?a Vi?t Nam ??i v?i s? ch? ng? c?a Trung Hoa. Or else it did not think it possible that the United States could be brought to total defeat. Ho?c nó ?ã không ngh? r?ng có khi nào mà Hoa K? l?i có th? b? d?n t?i m?t s? b?i tr?n hoàn toàn. In the aftermath of the fall of Saigon, Beijing was obliged to face the implications of its own policy. V?i h?u qu? c?a s? s?p ?? c?a Sàigòn, B?c Kinh b? bu?c ph?i ??i di?n v?i các hàm ý trong chính sách c?a chính nó.
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